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We investigate the output effects of severe banking and currency crises in emerging 
markets, focusing on whether “twin crises” (simultaneous occurrence of currency and banking 
crises) exist as a unique phenomenon and whether they entail especially large losses. Recent 
literature, mostly relating to the East Asian crisis, emphasizes the interplay and reinforcement 
between currency and banking crises, presumably making twin crises particularly damaging to 
the real economy. Using a panel data set over the 1975–97 period and covering 24 emerging-
market economies, we find that twin crises do not contribute any additional (marginal) negative 
impact on output growth. That is, twin crises do not adversely impact output over and above the 
independent effects associated with a currency and banking crisis taken together. We find that 
currency (banking) crises are very damaging, reducing output by about 5–8 (8–10) percent over a 
two-four year period. The cumulative output loss of both types of crises occurring at the same 
time is therefore very large, around 13–18 percent, and should alarm policymakers. However, 
twin crises are “bad” only in that they entail output losses associated with both currency and 
banking crises, not because there are additional feedback or interactive effects further damaging 
the economy. This result is robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using IV 
and GMM estimation procedures that correct bias associated with simultaneity and estimation of 
dynamic panel models with country-specific effects.  
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1. Introduction 
Severe financial crises occur with some frequency in emerging-market economies—more than 
51 (33) currency (banking) crises episodes over the past 25 years and 20 occurrences of “twin crises” 
(currency and banking crises that occurred simultaneously, shown in Appendix A). Moreover, this 
frequency of financial crises appears to be a reoccurring phenomenon, persistent over time and 
across regions of the world (Bordo et al., 2001; Glick and Hutchison, 2001). A large and growing 
empirical literature attempts to explain the factors that cause currency, banking and twin crises, as 
well as their timing, on the basis of macroeconomic, institutional and structural factors. See, for 
example, Arteta and Eichengreen, forthcoming; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Glick and Hutchison, 2001; 
Hutchison and McDill, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996.  
Recent theoretical literature emphasizes the potential impact of financial crises on output growth. 
A sharp devaluation (currency/balance of payments crisis) may have a contractionary effect on 
output, working through such channels as a wealth effect on aggregate demand, higher production 
costs, disruption in credit markets, or a sudden cessation in capital inflows limiting imported capital 
goods.
1 Banking crises may have adverse effects on output by disrupting the process of credit 
intermediation.
2 Any number of factors may induce a banking crisis (e.g. exogenous shock reducing 
the collateral value of assets, sunspot bank runs, and so on), and the transmission to the real 
economy may take the form of a financial accelerator, credit constraints, decrease in collateral 
values, disruption in the payments system, bankruptcies and other channels (e.g. Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1996; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). There is also an emerging 
theoretical literature linking banking and currency crises, and how these twin crises may emerge—
where the initial disturbance could emanate from a currency crisis, a bank crisis, or a common shock 
to both sectors (Glick and Hutchison, 2001).  
However, there is no simple theoretical rationale for why a twin crisis need have an adverse 
effect on the economy greater than the cumulative effect of a currency and banking crisis measured 
                                                           
1  A traditional view of currency crises, however, is that, with wage and price rigidities, a sharp nominal 
devaluation would produce a real depreciation in the short-run, increase exports and stimulate employment 
and output. Indeed, a sharp devaluation in the past was often accompanied by accusations that a country 
was pursuing a “beggar thy neighbour” policy and “exporting” unemployment. 
2  Allen and Gale (1998), by contrast, show that financial sector crises may be “optimal” from a welfare point 
of view, increasing long-run efficiency and growth in the economy as they are used as a mechanism to 
optimally distribute risk. 2 
separately. Clearly, the simultaneous occurrence of a currency and banking crisis could have 
disruptive effects on the real economy working through currency exposure and bank balance sheets, 
bank runs, and disruption in international credit markets and capital flows (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 
1999; Dekle and Kletzer, 2001; Goldfajn and Valdés, 1997). But is there something special about a 
twin crisis making output losses greater than would be anticipated simply by consider the additive 
effect of a currency and bank crisis? It is possible that feedback effects, contagion and linkages 
between domestic and international financial markets might make output losses of twin crises 
particularly severe, but difficult to model theoretically. Nonetheless, policy discussions attempting 
to explain why some economies, such as those in East Asia, seemed to suffer disproportionately 
from financial crises frequently point to the linkage between currency and banking crises. And 
casual observation would seem to bear this out.  
There is surprisingly little empirical literature, however, systematically testing the extent to 
which financial crises impact output growth and no empirical article of which we are aware that 
focuses on twin crises. A few articles, reviewed in Section 2, consider the impact of either a currency 
or a banking crisis separately on the real economy. But we believe the key issue regarding the impact 
of twin crises is the marginal output growth effect of a simultaneous occurrence of a currency and 
banking crisis.
3 In particular, in this study we ask whether output losses associated with a twin crisis 
are significantly greater than would have been predicted by the combined effect of a currency and 
banking crisis measured independently. That this question has not been fully addressed is surprising, 
given its enormous theoretical and policy import. Indeed, if there is no marginal output effect of a 
twin crisis, one may question whether a twin crisis is an interesting phenomenon in its own right. We 
investigate this issue directly and apply our analysis to answer whether East Asian output collapse in 
1998 was likely associated with the fact that all of these nations experienced severe twin crises.  
Our objective is to test the output effects of a twin crisis by decomposing that part associated 
with a currency crisis, a banking crisis, and the interaction between the two. The latter element is our 
focus. We investigate the particular aspect of a twin crisis that may make it worse for the economy—
as suggested by recent policy discussions—than the typical crisis or even the combined effect of a 
currency and banking crisis treated as if they were independent events. To this end, we investigate 
                                                           
3  Indeed, only Bordo et al. (2001) address the potential effects of a twin crisis. They look at a cross-section of 
countries in recession and focuses on whether the costs of financial crises are the same today as over the 
century ending in 1971 (the collapse of Bretton Woods). 
 3 
output growth developments for emerging-market economies in a panel data set over 1975–97. We 
measure the impact of twin crises, carefully controlling for domestic and external factors, country 
time-invariant effects, and state of the business cycle. Simultaneity between financial crises and 
output growth is likely in this context, and we employ the fixed-effects panel IV and GMM 
estimation procedures, respectively, of Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) 
to address this issue.  
We concentrate our investigation on emerging markets since they are the focus of policy 
discussions and recent experiences of twin crises and output collapses. Several recent studies 
indicate that emerging markets may be different with respect to the factors that make them 
susceptible to a financial crisis (Glick and Hutchison, 2001) and how they respond to them (IMF, 
1998). Specifically, emerging markets tend to be open to international capital inflows, and have 
experienced large private capital inflows that are typically short-term. This debt is also usually 
denominated in foreign currency (generally the US$). These large short-term foreign-currency debt 
positions increase the vulnerability of these economies to swings in exchange rates and cessation of 
new capital to roll over existing debt (the “sudden stop” syndrome of Calvo, 1998). Emerging 
markets therefore appear most vulnerable to twin crises and, potentially, their adverse consequences.  
Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on financial crises and highlights our contribution to 
the literature. Section 3 presents the basic empirical model. Section 4 discusses the data employed in 
the study. Section 5 reports before/after (currency, banking and twin crises) summary statistics on 
key macroeconomic variables and the primary empirical results of the study. This section presents 
estimation results of the output equations, model dynamics and robustness checks. Section 6 presents 
predictions for output development in the East Asian crisis obtained by simulating our empirical 
results for the out-of-sample data for the five Asian 1998 crisis countries. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2.   Literature on the Output Costs of Currency and Banking Crises 
Several studies in the literature investigate the output costs of currency crises, but very few 
systematically analyze the costs of banking crises or both forms of crises taken together. Most 
important for our purposes, no studies of which we are aware measure the feedback and interactive 
affect on output arising from a twin crisis.  4 
Most of the limited empirical literature on the output costs of currency and balance of payments 
crises focus on single crisis episodes (e.g. Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Lane and Phillips, 1999) or on 
episodes that are known to have been contractionary (e.g. Calvo and Reinhart, 1999). Exceptions 
that analyse output developments around the time of a currency crisis in a broad sample of countries 
are Aziz et al. (2000), Barro (2001), Bordo et al. (2001), Gupta et al. (2000) and Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin (2000).  
McDill (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2001) focus on the output cost of a banking crisis. 
McDill (2000) investigates the effect of banking crises on a panel data set comprising industrial, 
emerging and developing economies. She regresses output growth on contemporaneous banking 
crises and several control variables (lagged exchange rate depreciation, the real interest rate, lagged 
money growth and lagged change in stock price). She finds that banking crises are associated with 
1.2–1.8 percentage point decline in output growth during each year of the banking crisis. Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2000) consider a cross-section of 36 banking crises, investigating macroeconomic 
developments before, during and after crisis episodes. They test differences in the developments of 
each variable (e.g. output growth) during these different periods (before, during and after) using a 
regression that accounts for heterogeneity across countries. They find that a banking crisis is 
associated (contemporaneously) with a 4-percentage point decline in output growth and that growth 
remains depressed in the year following the crisis.  
 
Output Costs of Twin Crises 
Barro (2001) and Bordo et al. (2001) are the only papers of which we are aware that attempt to 
measure the output cost of a currency crisis and a banking crisis in the same model. Barro (2001), 
however, measures the effects of these crises separately—the twin crisis phenomenon is not 
investigated. Bordo et al. (2001) consider the output costs of twin crises, but measure this 
phenomenon independently of currency and banking crises.  
Specifically, Barro (2001) considers the pattern of 5-year average output growth in a broad panel 
data set covering industrial, emerging and developing economies. He regresses 5-year output growth 
on conventional control variables (e.g. per capita GDP, schooling, life expectancy) and 
contemporaneous and lagged currency and banking crises. The crisis variable measures a (1,0) 
dummy for a crisis occurrence anytime during the focal 5-year period. He finds that a currency 
(banking) crisis is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decline (0.6 percent decline) in average 5 
output growth over the 5-year period. He concludes that the combination of a currency and a 
banking crisis reduces growth contemporaneously by about 2 percent per year.
4 
Bordo et al. (2001), in work most closely related to our own article, conduct a cross sectional 
investigation of the effect of both kinds of financial crises and their ‘twin’ effect on recessions. For 
their modern (1973-1997) sample, they find that the cumulative output loss for a ‘twin’ crisis over 
and above the average recession is 16% of GDP. This effect is measured separately from the 13% 
cumulative output loss that is found to be the combined effect of a banking and currency crisis (4.4% 
and 8.7% respectively).
5 Overall, their result is ambiguous about the exact difference in outcomes 
between a ‘twin’ and a combined currency-and-banking crisis phenomenon.  
 
3.  Estimating the Effects of Currency, Banking and Twin Crises on Real Output Growth 
Our contribution is to measure the additional output cost of a twin crisis, over and above that that 
may be associated with currency and banking crises viewed as separate phenomena. Unlike other 
literature in this area, we also control for simultaneity issues, and biases associated with estimation 
of fixed-effects dynamic panel data models. Estimating this model for emerging market economies, 
we are also able to address whether twins are especially problematic in general terms and whether 
the deep recession in East Asia was typical of the “bad” outcome of a twin crisis.  
Our methodological approach begins by explaining output growth in emerging markets by a 
standard set of variables as well as currency, banking and twin crises. The determinants of output in 
this model are a set of domestic policy, structural, and external factors, as well as country-specific 
effects and lagged output growth. Domestic policy factors are changes in government budget 
surpluses and credit growth. External factors are growth in foreign output and real exchange rate 
overvaluation. The structural factor we consider is the openness of the economy to international 
trade. Country-specific effects are introduced in order to account for the widely varying growth 
experiences in our set of emerging-market economies over the past 25 years. All of the variables, 
with the exception of foreign output, are introduced with a one-year lag in order to capture the 
delayed response of output to macroeconomic developments. This formulation of the model also 
                                                           
4  It is noteworthy, however, that Barro (2001) also finds that the currency (banking) crisis is followed by a 
0.6 (0.9) percentage point and statistically significant rise in average output growth during the subsequent 
5-year period. The net effect is an average 0.2 percentage point decline in output growth per year over the 
decade when a currency crisis coincides with a banking crisis. 
5 The equivalent results for their 1880-1997 sample are 14.8%, 3.2% and 7.8% respectively. 
 6 
avoids the potential for biased coefficient estimates on the domestic policy variables due to feedback 
effects from output growth to policy formulation (simultaneous equation bias). Our main concern in 
this context is to introduce relevant control variables into the regression equation so that the 
identified impact of a crisis on output growth is not simply due to omitted-variables bias. 
In the context of our “benchmark” model, we test for the additional effect on output growth 
arising from a currency, banking and twin crises. We consider both lagged and contemporaneous 
effects of crises on output growth, and also estimate several variants of the model, including changes 
in the lag structure and definition of crises, to check the robustness of the basic results. The 
coefficient estimates on our crises measures may be interpreted as the marginal effects of crises, 
after controlling for several of the other factors that may influence the evolution of output growth.      
The formal specification of the empirical model is as follows. The growth of real GDP for the ith 
country at time t ( it y ) is explained by policy variables ( ) 1 (  t i x ); external and structural factors ( ) ( i w ); 
the recent occurrence of a currency or a banking crisis ( CC
i D ) ( ,  BK
i D ) ( ), a 'twin' crisis ( CC
i D ) ( * BK
i D ) ( ), 





i D TW BK
i D BK CC
i D CC
i w h t i x k it y                      ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0
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where x is a k-element vector of policy variables for country i at time t, w is an h-element vector of 
external variables for country i at times (t or t-1),  CC
t i D ) ( is a dummy variable equal to unity if the 
country has recently experienced a currency crisis or balance of payments crisis (and zero otherwise) 
and likewise for a banking and twin crises.  it   is a zero mean, fixed variance, disturbance term.  0  is 
a vector of country effects (allowing average growth rates to vary across countries in the sample), 
k  is a k-element vector measuring the impact of policy changes on output,  h   is an h-element 
vector measuring the impact of exogenous factors on output, and 
CC  , 
BK   and 
TW  measure the 
output growth effects of currency, banking and twin crises respectively.  
In our main estimates we follow a procedure first suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981) that 
takes into account the bias in estimation of a dynamic panel with predetermined and endogenous 
variables (for a rigorous formulation of this bias, see Nickel, 1981). This three-step estimation 
methodology is an instrumental variable estimator that takes into account the possible correlation 
between the independent variables and the individual country-specific effects, as well possible 7 
simultaneity issues running from output growth (our dependent variable) and currency, banking and 
twin crises (three of the explanatory variables). When a correlation exists between the independent 
variables and the individual country-specific effects, estimation of a dynamic model creates a 
correlation between time-invariant country-fixed effects and the error term. A similar correlation 
between the “crisis” explanatory variables and the error term exists when output fluctuations 
contribute to the onset of a crisis.  
In the first step, least squares estimates (with fixed effects) are employed to obtain consistent but 
inefficient estimates for the variance components for the coefficients of the time-varying variables. 
In the second step, an FGLS procedure is employed to obtain variances for the time-invariant 
variables. The third step is a weighted IV estimation using deviation from means of lagged values of 
the time-varying variables as instruments.
6 The procedure requires specifying which explanatory 
variables are to be treated as endogenous. In our specification, the endogenous explanatory variables 
are the three binary crisis measures (currency, banking and twin) and consideration is also taken for 
the lagged dependent variable.
7   
While the Hausman-Taylor (HT) procedure provides asymptotically unbiased estimates, a recent 
literature suggests it is not the most efficient estimator possible. A more efficient General Methods 
of Moments (GMM) procedure relies on utilizing more available moment conditions to obtain a 
more efficient estimation (e.g., Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; and Arellano and Bond, 1991 and 1998).
8 
This procedure, however, is usually employed in estimation of panels with a large number of 
individuals and short time-series such as in the literature on long-run growth (Bond et al., 2001). In 
our case, the data makes this procedure difficult to implement for most specifications of the model. 
We provide results using the Arellano and Bond (1998) GMM framework and show that our 
                                                           
6  In the final step all variables are transformed by:   vit*  =  vit  -  (1 - i) i v  where  i  =  
2 2
2




where vit denotes any of the aforementioned variables and  i v denotes a group mean and the variance 
components are the one obtained in first two steps. For exact details on the motivation and estimation 
procedure, see Greene (2001) and Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
7  Assuming any of the other control variables is not exogenous does not change our empirical results. 
8 For a detailed survey of asymptotic consistency results and GMM estimation methods casting doubts on 
some of the results in this literature, see Arellano and Honoré (forthcoming) and Bond et al. (2001). 8 




4. Data  Description 
Defining Currency and Balance of Payments Crises  
Our indicator of currency and balance of payments crises is constructed by identifying “large” 
values in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate 
changes and monthly (percent) international reserve losses.
10 Following convention (e.g. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of each component 
over the sample for each country. This excludes some large depreciations that occur during high 
inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizeable depreciation events in more moderate 
inflation periods for countries that have occasionally experienced periods of hyperinflation and 
extreme devaluation.
11 Our measure, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2000 and 2001), presumes 
that any nominal currency changes or reserve changes associated with exchange rate pressure should 
affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in the real exchange rate 
(at least in the short run). An episode of serious exchange rate pressure, i.e. a standard crisis episode, 
is defined as a value in the index—a threshold point—that exceeds the mean plus 2 times the 
country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds 5 percent.
12 The first condition 
insures that, relative to its own history, unusually large values of the index of currency pressure are 
counted as a crisis while the second condition attempts to screen out values that are insufficiently 
large in an economic (real) sense.  
                                                           
9  We use the Limdep software suite in all our estimations. We thank Professor William Greene for providing us 
with a update of the LINDEP package and the statistical procedure to estimate the GMM model 
10 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defence involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in 
many of the countries in our dataset. 
11 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes of 
hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country 
according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they 
calculate for each sub-sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define 
exchange rate crisis episodes. 9 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as defined 
above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given year if the 
currency pressure index for any month of that year satisfies our criteria. To reduce the chances of 
capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose windows on our data. In 
particular, after identifying each “large” indication of currency pressure, we treat any similar 
threshold point reached in the following 24-month window as a part of the same currency episode 
and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new crises. With this 
methodology, we identify 51 currency crises, 68 crisis years and 42 major currency crises for our 
emerging markets dataset over the 1975-97 period (see Table 1). 
 
Defining Banking Crises  
Banking problems are usually difficult to identify empirically because of data limitations. The 
potential for a bank run is not directly observable and, once either a bank run or large-scale 
government intervention has occurred, the situation most likely will have been preceded by a 
protracted deterioration in the quality of assets held by banks. Identifying banking sector distress by 
the deterioration of bank asset quality is also difficult since direct market indicators of asset value 
are usually lacking. This is an important limitation since most banking problems in recent years are 
not associated with bank runs but with deterioration in asset quality and subsequent government 
intervention. Moreover, it is often laxity or failure of government analysis in identifying banking 
fragility, and slow follow-up action once a problem is recognized, that allows the situation to 
deteriorate to the point of a systemic crisis involving large-scale government intervention.  
Our measure identifies and dates episodes of banking sector distress following the criteria of 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, and updated on the IMF Web page) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998). If an episode of banking distress is identified in either study, it is included in our 
sample. If there is ambiguity over the timing of the episode, we use the dating scheme of Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) since it tends to be more specific about the precise start and end of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
12 Other studies defining the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments include 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Esquivel and Larrain (1998). 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off point is 
somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise 
cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. Our output equation estimates using “major” currency crises, 
evaluated with the 3-standard deviation threshold, are very similar to the benchmark crisis measure. 10 
each episode.
13 Major bank crises are taken from Caprio and Klingebiel and defined as posing a 
substantial threat to the entire financial system.  
Our emerging markets dataset over the 1975-97 period includes 33 banking crises, 105 crisis 
years, and 21 major banking crises. Thus, the average duration of a banking crisis is 3.2 years while 
the average duration of a currency crisis is only 1.3 years. 
 
Defining Twin Crises  
Our definition of twin crises, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2001), marks a crisis if the onset 
of a banking crisis occurred two years before, during, or after the onset of a currency crisis. We use 
this definition to allow for the imprecise identification of banking crises previously discussed. Using 
a narrower one-year band does not qualitatively alter our results. We identify 20 instances of a 'twin' 
crisis in our dataset. 
 
Control Variables in the Output Growth Equation 
As discussed in section 2, the domestic policy factors included in our estimation are lagged 
changes in government budgets and lagged credit growth; external factors are (trade-weighted) 
external growth rates of the G-3 and lagged index of real exchange rate overvaluation; and the 
structural factor we consider is the openness of the economy to international trade.
14 All of the 
macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM. 
                                                           
13 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) identify banking sector distress as a situation where one of the 
following conditions hold: ratio of non-performing assets to total assets is greater than 2 percent of GDP; 
cost of the rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large scale 
nationalization of banks; and extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit 
freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in 
response to the crisis. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) do not offer a systematic identification scheme but rely 
on expert opinions solicited from varied sources. They identify a systemic crisis as one in which “much or 
all of bank capital [was] being exhausted”. Arteta and Eichengreen (forthcoming) compare these sources 
and others and conclude that their empirical results do not depend on the banking identification scheme 
used. 
14 The 'openness' variable is defined as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP. Real exchange rate 
overvaluation is defined as deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. The real 
trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (defined in 
terms of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade-weights are 
based on the average bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 
1990. 11 
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP figures are available 
for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975–97. We use annual observations. We 
employ monthly data for our (real) exchange rate and international reserves pressure index to 
identify currency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs. While some of our control 
variables are available for quarterly or even monthly frequency, banking crises are typically 
identifiable only in annual data. 
 
5. Empirical  Results   
Conditional Probabilities for Crises Onsets 
Table 2 presents hypothesis tests on the likelihood that currency and banking crises (twins) are 
statistically independent. The hypothesis that banking and currency crisis are not correlated can be 
rejected with probability of more than 99%. For our sample, the onsets of 31% of banking crises 
were accompanied by currency turmoil. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation 
between lagged banking crises and contemporaneous currency crises but not vice versa. This result 
is similar to that found in Glick and Hutchison (2001) for a dataset including developing countries as 
well as emerging markets.
15 
 
Macro Developments: Before/After Crises Statistics 
Table 3 present summary statistics on key macroeconomic developments around currency (upper 
panel) and banking (lower panel) crises. It presents before-after statistics for the standard definitions 
of ‘normal’ currency, banking, and twin crises mentioned above. Four-year windows are imposed on 
the data to clearly delineate the macroeconomic developments around the time of crisis.  
Our focus variable, real GDP growth, shows an average decline of about 1.3 percentage points in 
the year a currency crisis takes place, and it recovers only minimally the following year (by 0.3 
percentage points). Average output growth goes back to its previous level two years after the crisis, 
and this upturn is statistically significant. This pattern is almost identical for standard and major 
crises (not reported for brevity). Average losses appear to be even smaller for our sub-sample of 
currency crises without banking crises (reducing output growth by only 0.5 percentage points).  
                                                           
15 This result is consistent with the find, reported in Glick and Hutchison (2000), that causality is more likely 
to run from banking to currency crises and not, as is sometimes portrayed for the turmoil in East Asia, from 
a currency crisis to a systemic banking failure. 12 
By contrast, output developments around banking crises are striking by the very large costs 
involved (4.1 percentage points for each year of the crisis). Output growth dynamics surrounding 
twin crises are similar and appear to entail a reduction of 4.2 percentage points in the year of the 
crisis, followed by sustained depressed output for the following two year. Hence, at first pass, the 
summary statistics indicate significant and—in some cases—prolonged effects of financial crises 
and twin crises in particular. We focus on more formal tests of this proposition in the sub-sections 
below.  
Interestingly, there are no evident statistical trends in the evolution of the budget surplus.
16 
Inflation rates trend upward starting from before the onset of either a currency or twin crisis, but not 
a banking one. More pertinent is the fact that twin crises occur more frequently in  countries with 
higher inflation rates before, during and after the crisis episode when compared to other crisis 
episodes. Our index for real exchange rate overvaluation shows dynamics that can be expected given 
the fact that it is a key element used to identify currency crises.  
      
Benchmark Model Estimates  
Table 4 presents results from our benchmark model. Judging by the adjusted R-square statistics, 
the benchmark without any of the crisis variables explains 27 percent of the variation in output 
growth. The statistically significant control variables are external output growth, real exchange rate 
overvaluation, and lagged output growth. A one- percent rise in the growth rate of the G-3 
economies raises output growth in emerging-market economies by about, on average, 0.3–0.4 
percentage points. A rise in real exchange rate overvaluation significantly reduces output growth. 
This is noteworthy in its own right, indicating that emerging market economies should avoid 
currency overvaluation, but also because real exchange rate overvaluation is a reliable predictor of 
future currency crises (see Glick and Hutchison, 2001). However, budget changes, credit growth and 
the openness measure are not statistically significant. The coefficient estimates for the control 
variables are consistent across alternative specifications of the model reported in columns (1)–(5) of 
Table 4 and in the other tables. 
Turning to the key variables of interest, the coefficient estimates reported in column (2) indicate 
that a currency crisis is associated with a contemporaneous (lagged) fall in GDP growth of about 2.9 
                                                           
16 While not presented here, the same is true for credit growth rates. Foreign interest rates typically rise about 
100 basis points on average and foreign growth rates decline modestly surrounding currency crises. 13 
(2.5) percentage points. Very similar results are obtained, but not reported for brevity, when 
including only the contemporaneous or the lagged currency crisis binary variable. After a two-year 
period, the cumulative negative effect of a currency crisis on output is about 5.5 percent.  
Table 4 also presents more information on the dynamics of output adjustment to currency crises. 
To allow for additional lagged values, we focus attention on the currency crisis “onset”—the initial 
year of the currency crisis. Column (3) reports the analogous regression to (2) using the onset 
version of the variable. Not surprisingly, since most currency crises have duration of only about one 
year, the results of columns (3) are very similar to those reported in column (2) with a cumulative 
output effect of 5.1 percentage points. Adding further lags (second, third and fourth year lags) to the 
model, reported in column 4, indicate that the contemporaneous and one-year ahead effects of a 
currency crisis remain negative and highly significant and with roughly the same magnitudes as 
reported previously. This is followed by a substantial negative, but statistically insignificant, effect 
on the second year following a crisis and eventually a (insignificant) positive output effect in the 
third- and fourth years. Thus, currency crises in emerging markets seem to affect output 1–2 years 
following a crisis. This result remains when some of the insignificant lags are dropped. Our results 
therefore do not indicate a persistent effect—beyond a two-year horizon—of crises on output 
growth.  
We also include lead values of currency crises in the equations, shown in columns (5), to further 
investigate the dynamic responses. Only one of the lead value coefficients, the one-year lead value 
of currency crises, is statistically significant. This result indicates that a currency crisis tends to 
follow, by about a year, a decline in real output growth. On the other hand, a currency crisis also is 
associated with a further decline in output growth contemporaneously and over a period of two 
years. These model estimates suggest that, within 2–3 years, output declines cumulatively by almost 
8 percent for an average currency crisis in an emerging-market economy. 
An important question is whether a particularly severe crisis—substantially larger than the 
normal crisis—has an especially severe effect on growth. To investigate this issue, we introduce a 
“major” currency crisis variable that is identified by a threshold point in our pressure index that 
exceeds 3-standard deviations from the mean. For brevity we do not report these results. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the output effects of a major crisis are not larger than the typical crisis situation. 
Coefficients for a version of column (3) using the major crisis measure yield coefficients of –2.3 and 
–2.8 for the contemporaneous and lagged major currency crisis variables, respectively. Major 14 
currency and balance of payments crises do not appear to have a substantially different impact on 
output growth than the average crisis (identified using a 2-standard deviation threshold).  
 
Banking and Twin Crises 
The full results for our model are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the cost of a 
banking crisis with and without the inclusion of lagged and contemporaneous currency crises 
variables. In both cases, banking crises are costly: 3–3.5 percentage points of GDP growth is lost for 
each year of the crisis. As an average banking crisis lasts 3.3 years the cumulative output loss 
amounts to around 10 percent of GDP.  
Our main results are presented in columns (3)—the coefficient on the twin crisis interactive 
variable is negative but not statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, the coefficients on the 
currency and banking crises variables stay almost exactly the same (–4.2 and –3.0 respectively). 
Neither does the inclusion of leads and lags for the banking crisis dummy, reported in column (4), 
change the magnitude of these coefficients.
17 
The joint occurrence of crises has a very large average effect on output growth—depressing GDP 
by about 15–18 percent over a 3–4 year period. Moreover, it appears that contagion between crises is 
a serious problem in emerging markets so that the threat (probability) of a twin crisis is significant 
given that either a banking or a currency crisis occurs (Table 2). However, twin crises do not seem to 
have any additional marginal effect on output above and beyond the effect of the contemporaneous 
occurrence of a banking and currency crisis. Twin crises are “bad” in that they entail output losses 
associated with both a currency and banking crisis, but there does not appear to be additional 
feedback effects further damaging the economy.  
Robustness Tests 
To check the robustness of our results we first examine whether our estimation technique, based 
on the Hausman and Taylor (1981) IV estimator, gives similar coefficient estimates from those 
obtained by the standard least squares fixed effect estimator with a White heteroscedasticity 
correction (LSDV) or the more efficient first-differenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991, 1998). These results are reported in Table 6 columns (1)-(3) where we also include the 
                                                           
17 Interestingly, both the coefficients on the lead and lag of banking crises are insignificantly different from 
zero as well. 15 
HT estimation for exactly the same sample.
18 There is very little difference between the coefficients 
obtained on our focus variables—currency and banking crises—in all three estimation techniques. 
As can be expected, the GMM estimator yields much higher t-statistics.  
We also run the same model for a larger sample including 42 developing countries as well as the 
emerging markets sample. Data availability guided our choice of additional countries.
19 Comparisons 
of column (4) with column (2) in Table 6 leads us to conclude that both currency and banking crises 
have a weaker impact on output growth in our larger sample of developing countries— –2.0 instead 
of –3.3 for lagged currency crises and –2.6 instead of –3.1 for banking crises. Column (5) examines 
the robustness of our central result. The insignificance of the marginal effect of a twin crisis is also 
evident in our larger sample of developing countries as well. That is, the effects of both currency and 
banking crises are somewhat weaker and the coefficient on the twin crisis variable is still 
insignificantly different from zero. 
In column (6) in Table 6 we investigate whether the main results are robust when the variables of 
interest are severe or major banking and currency crises. As was reported previously for currency 
crises, the severity of a banking crisis does not appear to influence its economic cost in terms of 
foregone output growth. (Of course, a severe banking crisis most probably entails larger fiscal 
costs.
20) Our central finding is indeed robust to the “major crises” specification—major twin crises 
do not seem to have any statistically discernible marginal impact on output growth beyond the 
separate effects of major currency and banking crises. 
It is possible that the results reported to this point are subject to sample selection bias. Countries 
that experience a currency or banking crises may be different in important respects from other 
countries or episodes. That is, it may not be the currency/banking crisis per se but several other 
factors contributing to them that are causing the decline in output growth. This is a variant of the 
sample selection bias problem.  
We employ Heckman’s (1979) Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to control for sample selection bias of 
this form. This statistic is constructed from the results of probit regressions explaining both currency 
                                                           
18 The sample here is somewhat smaller than the one used in the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. The GMM 
estimator poses both data restrictions and restrictions on the models that could be estimated with our data 
(because of insufficient variation of the ‘twin’ variable within individual countries). 
19 We also restricted our sample for non-OECD countries with a population of more than one million. 
20 See, for example, Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) for estimates of the fiscal costs of banking crises. These 
might be construed, though, as involving only a transfer of resources and not imposing real costs on the 
economy. 16 
and banking crises and added as an additional explanatory variable in the output growth 
regressions.
21 Including the IMR in the regression of interest prevents possible bias in our coefficient 
estimates and is a standard approach to account for sample selection bias.
22 For brevity, these results 
are not reported. In no case is the IMR coefficient statistically significant and, assuming the probit 
equations were correctly specified, sample selection bias may be rejected. More importantly, the 
coefficient estimates on the other explanatory factors, both control and crises variables are very 
similar to those reported in Table 5.  
 
6.  Out of Sample Growth Forecasts for the 1998 East Asian Crisis 
Table 7 presents the predicted values for output growth for the five East Asian countries that 
experienced a severe financial crisis in 1997 and large output contractions in 1998—Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These predictions are for 1998 output growth rates 
and are based on 1997 values of the explanatory variables and the coefficient estimates obtained 
from the model presented in column (4) of Table 5. Predicted values are decomposed into: (a) 
domestic factors (lagged output growth, change in budget surplus, credit growth, and country-
specific effects), (b) external-structural factors (external growth, real exchange rate overvaluation 
and openness), (c) the currency, banking, and twin crisis effects.  
Predicted output growth for all 5 countries is close to zero in 1998—small negative predictions 
for Indonesia and Thailand and small positive predictions for Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
The forecast errors (unexpected declines in output) are therefore very large. The significant negative 
effect exerted by the crisis variables is dominated by a strong positive domestic effect—mainly a 
history of very strong growth in the region and the consequently large country-specific effects—and 
a modestly supportive external-structural growth environment.  
It appears that the depth of the East Asian output collapse in 1998 is much greater than could 
have been expected based on the average effect of financial crises on emerging markets in the post 
Bretton-Woods period. Our research suggests that currency, banking and twin crises only explain a 
small part of the collapse of output observed in these countries. There appears to have been a 
common shock or common vulnerability in these countries—unobserved in this model—causing the 
                                                           
21 The exact specifications of the probit regressions are taken from Glick and Hutchison, 2001. Details 
available from the authors upon request. 
22 For a survey of sample selection correction methodologies see Blundell and Costa Días, 2000. 
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unexpectedly large collapse in output. Alternatively, the effects of the crisis may have impacted 
output in the region much faster than generally occurs, i.e. the lagged effect of a typical crisis may 
have manifested earlier in the East Asian case. This could also explain the short but sharp duration of 
the recession in most East Asian countries at the time.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Despite the popular perception, we find no support for the conjecture that twin crises exert 
especially large output costs in emerging-market economies. The cost of either a currency or a 
banking crisis is highly significant and, taken together, is of course even larger. But twin crises do 
not contribute any additional (marginal) negative impact on output growth. In particular, we find that 
currency (banking) crises are very damaging, reducing output by about 5–8 (8–10) percent over a 
two-four year period. The combined effect of the two crises occurring simultaneously is therefore 
about 13–18 percent of output. These are very large estimates of output losses, and should alarm 
policymakers, particularly in light of the robustness of the empirical results to model specification 
and estimation technique 
Nonetheless, twin crises are “bad” only in that they entail output losses associated with both 
currency and banking crises, apparently not because additional feedback or interactive effects further 
damage the economy. And the cumulative effects of a currency, banking and twin crisis also do not 
satisfactorily explain the deep recessions in East Asia in 1998.  
If not due to a twin crisis, what then is responsible for the massive output losses seen in East 
Asia? First, we do not entirely discount twin crises—or at least the combined effect of a currency 
and a banking crisis—since it is possible that the cumulative effects occurring over a 2–4 year period 
may have manifested sooner. This is not typical for the response of economies to financial crises, but 
is possible. A second explanation lies elsewhere, perhaps a common unobserved shock hitting the 
region that lowered expectations of long-run growth potential and investment. This shock may be 
linked in turn to international capital markets that become virtually dysfunctional in the face of a 
financial crisis and perhaps overreact by reversing capital flows entirely. However, these are 
conjunctures beyond the scope of this article. The underlying cause of the depth of the East Asian 
recession remains an open question.  
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Table 1 - Frequency of Banking and Currency Crises in Emerging Markets 
  Threshold  Number of 
events a 
Standard 51  (9%) 
Currency crisis episodes b 
Major 42  (8%) 
       Currency crisis years  Standard  68 (12%) 
Standard 33  (7%) 
Banking Crisis episodes 
Major 21  (4%) 
       Banking crisis years  Standard  105 (21%) 
Twin Crisis episodes c  Standard 20  (3%) 
a The number in parentheses is the percent of total observations in the sample associated 
  with each type of crisis.  
b A standard crisis is defined as a deviation of the currency pressure index of more 
than 2 standard deviations from the country-specific mean (3SD for major crises). See 
text for details on banking crises. 
c Standard currency crisis at (t) with a banking crisis for a 2 year band. 
 
 
Table 2 - Banking and Currency Crises: Conditional Probabilities 
a 






% of banking crisis onsets associated with a 





% of currency crisis onsets associated with a 





% of banking crisis onsets associated with a 





% of currency crisis onsets associated with a 





% of banking crisis onsets associated with a 





% of currency crisis onsets associated with a 





a chi square probability of independence of the two series in parenthesis. 
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
a 
 
  Type of Crisis  t-2  t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 
A. Currency Crises 
Currency  4.0 2.7 1.4 1.7 3.6* 
currency (no banking)  3.6  2.4  1.9  1.7  3.6* 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
(%)  Twin (currency and banking)  4.3  4.9  0.7***  1.0  2.1 
Currency  -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 
currency  (no  banking)  -0.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Change in 
budget 
surplus (%)  Twin  (currency  and  banking)  -1.4 -2.1 -1.1 -1.9 -0.5 
Currency  30.5 31.6 36.3 43.4 42.0 
currency  (no  banking)  28.1 25.9 23.8 33.0 35.0 
Inflation rate 
(%) 
Twin  (currency  and  banking)  43.2 53.2 67.9 57.6 50.1 
Currency 8.0  14.7*  1.6***  -6.8**  -4.3 
currency (no banking)  12.1  18.1  4.1***  -6.7***  -4.8 
RER over- 
valuation 
measure  Twin (currency and banking)  -0.4  7.4  3.0  4.0  -2.8 
 
B. Banking Crises 
Real GDP growth rate (%)  5.1  5.1  1.0***  5.9***  6.5 
Change in budget surplus (%)  -0.5 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 
Inflation  rate  (%)  29.7 32.5 33.6 29.0 26.5 
RER overvaluation measure  1.5  8.3*  4.1  -6.5***  -3.7 
a *, **, and *** denote rejection of same mean as the number to the left with 10, 5 and 1 percent 
confidence levels. 23 
Table 4 - Output Growth and Currency Crises – Benchmark 
a 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (Hausman-Taylor Estimation)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






























































Currency crises onset dummy - lead (t+2)       -0.457 
(-0.66) 
Currency crises onset dummy - lead (t+1)       -1.558** 
(-2.21) 




























Adjusted R2   b  0.27 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.33 
Number of observations  374 374 373 370 370 
Correlation of error terms  0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 
a The regression in column (2) uses a ‘no window’ definition of crises instead of the ‘onset’ variable used in columns (3)-(5). 
b The Adjusted R
2 reported is for the fixed-effects least squares stage in the Hausman-Taylor procedure. 24 
Table 5 - Output Growth, Banking Crises and Twin Crises 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (Hausman-Taylor Estimation)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Currency crises dummy (t)    -2.427*** 
(-4.28) 
-2.363*** 
(-4.09)   






Leading Banking crises dummy 
(t+1) 
    0.467 
(0.58) 








Banking crises dummy (t-1)      0.809 
(0.87) 




Adjusted R2  0.34 0.47 0.45 0.41 
Number of observations  342 333 333 333 
Correlation of error terms  0.22 0.24 0.25 0.22 
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 Table 6 – Output Growth – Robustness Tests 
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Sample  280 280 280 574 574 333 
a The column reports the results for a Major Banking Crises variable (and its corresponding ‘twin’ definition) – see text for details. 
 















Indonesia  5.15  0.56 -4.22 -2.96 -0.56 -2.03  -14.16 
Korea  5.37  0.89 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 0.90 -6.92 
Malaysia  5.81  0.62 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 1.05 -7.65 
Philippines  5.95  0.59 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 1.17 -0.54 
Thailand  4.40  0.71 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 -0.26  -10.73 26 
Appendix A 
Data for Banking and Currency Crises 
  Banking Crisis  Currency Crisis  Twin Crisis 
Argentina  1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995-1997  1975-1976, 1982-1983, 1989-1991  1980, 1989 
Brazil  1990, 1994-1997  1982-1983, 1987, 1990-1991, 1995  1990, 1994 
Chile  1976, 1981-1983  1985    
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  1982-1986       
Columbia 1982-1987  1985     
Costa Rica  1987, 1994-1997  1981    
Cyprus          
Indonesia  1994, 1997  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997  1997 
Jordan  1989-1990  1983, 1987-1989, 1992  1989 
Korea 1997  1980,  1997  1997 
Malaysia  1985-1988, 1997  1986, 1997  1985, 1997 
Malta     1992, 1997    
Mauritius  1996  1979, 1981    
Mexico  1981-1991, 1995-1997  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994-1995  1981, 1995 
Panama  1988-1989       
Philippines  1981-1987, 1997  1983-1984, 1986, 1997  1981, 1997 
Singapore  1982 1975    
South Africa  1977, 1985, 1989  1975, 1978, 1984-1986, 1996  1977, 1985 
Thailand  1983-1987, 1997  1981, 1984, 1997  1983, 1997 
Trinidad & Tobago  1982-1993  1985, 1988, 1993    
Tunisia 1991-1995  1993     
Turkey  1982-1985, 1991, 1994-1995  1978-1980, 1994  1994 
Uruguay  1981-1984 1982-1983 1981 
Venezuela  1978-86, 1994-1997  1984, 1986, 1994-1996  1994 
 
 